Abstract-The article deals with the issues of the security of distributed and scalable computer systems based on the risk-based approach. The main existing methods for predicting the consequences of the dangerous actions of the intrusion agents are described. There is shown a generalized structural scheme of job manager in the context of a risk-based approach. Suggested analytical assessments for the security risk level in the distributed computer systems allow performing the critical t ime values forecast for the situation analysis and decisionmaking for the current configuration o f a distributed computer system. These assessments are based on the number of used nodes and data links channels, the number of act ive security and monitoring mechanisms at the current period, as well as on the intensity of the security threats realization and on the activation intensity of the intrusion prevention mechanis ms. The proposed comprehensive analytical risks assessments allow analyzing the dynamics of intrusions processes, the dynamics of the security level recovery and the corresponding dynamics of the risks level in the distributed computer system. Index Terms-Distributed computer systems, Security analysis, Risk-based approach. NOMENCLATURE α -the average intensity of the security threats for the distributed computer systems resources x1 and x2; β -the average intensity of the security mechanis ms from the group x3 and x4 activation; R 0 -the initial security risk; R(t) -security risks in the distributed computer systems, changing at time t;
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β -the average intensity of the security mechanis ms from the group x3 and x4 activation; R 0 -the initial security risk; R(t) -security risks in the distributed computer systems, changing at time t;
x 1 -the number of nodes in the distributed computer system; x 2 -the number of data link channels;
x 3 -the number of the active security mechanisms; x 4 -the number of the security monitoring tools in the distributed computer systems;
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I. INTRODUCTION
There are a significant number of vulnerabilities in the Distributed Co mputer Systems (DCS), wh ich can be used by the intrusions agents for the attacks launching to get the unauthorized access to the information. In turn, there are known a nu mber of methods and mechanisms for the intrusion detection and the appropriate host-and networkbased systems for the monitoring and intrusion prevention [1] . ІSO-15408 [2] , [3] defines the requirements to the security mechanism and for the risk analysis at various stages of the security mechanisms design, development, imp lementation and maintenance. Also, this standard defines the function of the DCS owners and the informat ion that should be implemented for the protection against possible threats and intrusions. The security risk analysis for the DCS is one of the most important trends in the field of modern effect ive mechanisms for the information protection [4] , [5] .
The security of the DCS resources is based on their protection from the threats that are classified in view of the possible level of safety violation [6] - [9] . We consider all kinds of threats, and the most dangerous are those that are performed by the subjects. Fig. 1 shows the main components of the DCS security and their interconnection [1] - [3] . The effective protection of the modern co mputer systems requires support the safety of the operations with their resources, so there is a necessity for the timely identification of the potential threats to their security. It is necessary to analyze the fu ll range of the possible threats. [1] , [10] - [12] .
The typical violations of the DCS security are [1] - [3] :
• disclosure of the resources confidentiality that leads to the certain damage;
• vio lation of the resources integrity as a result of unauthorized modification;
• b locking of the access to the resources, in particular due to incorrect ban for the legal subjects.
The resources of the co mputer systems have a certain value, in particular, for their owners and for the intrusion agents as well. So, the security threats have potentially adverse effects on DCS resources, resulting in, inter alia, reducing the resources value [1] .
An analysis of existing threats allows us to define the risks to the security of the in formation systems, in addition, this analysis allo ws us to determine the countermeasures to neutralize potential threats and reduce security risks to an acceptable level. Standard ІSO-15408 defines the requirements to the risk analysis procedure at the various stages of design, development, imp lementation and maintenance of the security mechanis ms, as well as the actions of the owners of information and informat ion systems admin istrators, to protect them fro m possible threats and intrusions [2] , [3] .
Countermeasures can reduce the number of potential vulnerabilities in the information system with the protection mechanisms applying in accordance with established security policy. At the same time in case when the countermeasures are already implemented there may remain the residual vulnerabilities, wh ich can be used by intrusions agents. These vulnerabilities form a residual risk, wh ich is mit igated by the use of additional security mechanisms.
The owners need to make sure that the countermeasures employed by them prov ide an adequate reaction to the potential threats before to grant the access to their resources. In general, resource owners may not always objectively evaluate the effectiveness of the security mechanisms that are used and in this case there is required an independent assessment. The result of this assessment is the trust level to the security mechanisms in terms of reducing the risk of resources security. The trust level is characteristics of protection, which confirms the correctness and efficiency of their use, as this rating is used by the resource owner in the decision making process how to set an acceptable level o f security risk to its resources [13] .
The results of evaluation of security mechanis ms parameters must be verified in terms of their correctness, which will allow use the received assessment data to substantiate an acceptable level of security risk for a certain information system [14] .
II. METHODS FOR T HE EFFECTS PREDICTING OF T HE DANGEROUS ACTIONS OF T HE INTRUSION AGENTS
The methods for the evaluation and prediction of consequences of the dangerous actions of intrusion agents by the time are divided into two groups [15] - [18] :
• methods, that are based on a priori estimates obtained on the basis of theoretical models and analogies;
• methods, that are based on a posteriori assessmentsthe effects assessments for the already realized intrusion into computer systems.
• experimental: based on the processing of the parameters of the realized intrusion;
• co mbined: co mputational and experimental, based on the statistical data processing with the special mathematical models;
• mathemat ical: based on the mathematical models exclusively.
The estimated models, that are used to get a priori estimates, perform the tests on the really realized attacks and intrusions into computer systems.
A priori estimates of the effects of the hazardous actions differ by the time and goal [17] - [19] :
• preliminary assessment of the various scenarios of the dangerous actions initiating, performed by the preventive mechanis ms planning to protect the computer systems: it provides a basic security level, security monitoring, operative security control;
• operational parameter estimates of the realized intrusions performed to get an adequate reaction to security incidents.
The evaluation and prediction of the user actions involve the collection and processing of the data on the hazardous activities of the intrusion agents, the definition the perimeter of the co mputer systems components, that are under attack potentially, determination of the impact of the negative factors on the computer system functioning [20], [21] . This assessment allows select the most effective ways for the co mputer system protection, minimizes losses due to the attacks realization.
[20], [21] .
The risk assessment of the dangerous actions realization, i.e., the analysis of the dangerous actions repeatability and the alleged damage to a certain computer system is performed periodically, in particular, when there is performing an audit of the co mputer security for the risks control [22] . During the assessment of the dangerous actions realization, all the main risk factors are uncertain and there are used their estimates.
The forecast of the consequences of the dangerous actions of intrusions agents is a preliminary forecast for the certain computer system and for the certain type of the dangerous actions. The preliminary assessment of the impact of the hazardous activities is a particular problem of the risk assessment in a case when the initiating event has already occurred, i.e. the dangerous action was realized [21] , [22] . The fo recast is performed on the uncertain factors parameters, and the results of the prediction are used in the planning of the preventive mechanisms to protect the computer systems [22] , [23] .
The mathematical models for the consequences prediction of the dangerous actions of intrusion agents are based on a probabilistic approach assuming that the intrusion event is occurred already [24] . This takes into account both the probabilistic nature of the negative factors impact on the co mputer system, and the vulnerabilities of the co mputer system to these influences [24] . The levels of impact factors on the computer system security are the rando m variables and are specified by the relevant distribution. The vulnerab ilit ies of the co mputer system co mponents and resources are also described as random factors, due to the specifics of the development and support of the hardware and software. The random factors affecting the dangerous actions consequences are related to the danger degree, to the space-time threats and to the vulnerabilities of the computer system [24] , [25] .
The emergency evaluation of the situation in the case of the dangerous actions is performed by the time parameters of intrusions attempts, by the type of the computer system component that is under the attacks, and by the danger degree of the intrusion actions, that is received fro m the security mon itoring and control subsystems [24] , [25] . The emergency assessment is a special case of the above-described problem in case if the hazards and threats have already been realized. The results of this assessment are used in decisions making for the security control of the computer systems, to perform an effective reaction to security incidents [18] .
The assessment of the real situation that has arisen as a result of dangerous actions is performed by the data, that are obtained fro m safety mon itoring subsystem, and this assessment allow eliminate the uncertainty by the only one remain ing uncertain risk-factor -the losses [18] , [19] . The results of this assessment are used to clarify the earlier decisions on the implementation of the protective mechanis ms and to minimize the consequences of the intrusions.
The effect ive risk control imp lies the risks factors prediction, i.e. there are estimated the possible risks indicators for the some future time interval, for examp le, based on the methods of the time series extrapolation, auto-regression, and the others [25] , [26] . In order to perform the risk pred iction, the special mode ls are used, which describe the prospective state of DCS based on an analysis of its behavior during operations in the previous time intervals [26] .
Let us present the specifics of the risk p rediction task in apply to the security risk forecast for the dis tributed computer systems, which is solved to control of the DCS security. The following methods can be used in the risk prediction process [1] , [2] , [17] - [19] :
• the prediction of the possible safety violation, i.e. the realization of the corresponding triggering dangerous events;
• the forecasting of the effects of hazardous events, i.e., the safety violation.
For a timely forecasting of hazardous events during the operation of the computer system or to identify them at the initial stage there is required a special system fo r the subjects actions monitoring in the computer systems. Based on the information, that is received on the monitored data, the security administrator makes the operative decisions on the security mechanisms activation to prevent and/or to reduce the loss due to a security violations (attacks) on computer systems [17] - [19] . The methods for the forecast of the dangerous events by the projected parameters, in turn, are subdivided into methods of forecasting their location, level, the o nset time and the repetition rate [27] - [30] . This problem can be solved in different ways depending on the specifics of the computer systems. The most effective approach is to proactively predict the dangerous events (attacks) and to apply the adequate measures in the stage of their preparation [17] - [19] . In the case when the time is limited for an adequate reaction to a hazardous event, it is expedient to activate the preventive security mechanis m, based on the statistical evaluation of the recurrence frequency of dangerous events [1] .
In fact, the task of the security risks analysis is associated with the assessment of the risk of exceeding of a predetermined maximu m t ime interval for the reaction to possible intrusions in the DCS Job Manager (JM) functions [34] . This risk depends on two factors: the probability and the consequences of the exceeding of the time for the situation analysis and decision making in the DCS JM. The p robability of the time exceeding is functionally linked to the values of the upper and lower bounds of the allowable t ime period for the situation analysis and decision-making [32] .
In general, the follo wing factors have impact on the security risks: the nu mber of nodes and link channels of DCS, the intensity of the security threats to DCS resources realization, the intensity of security mechanis ms activation, i.e., the rate of reaction to the hazardous events [1] , [17] - [19] , [31] , [32] . In the case, when the rate of the security threats realizat ion is exceeded the reaction rate, the attack is launched on the DCS resources [33] . The analysis of the existing security threats allow determine the risks of safety violations for the co mputer systems resources and determine the countermeasures to neutralize the potential threats, by reducing the security risks to an acceptable level [31] . Taken countermeasures allo w reduce the number of potential vulnerab ilit ies in the computer system, and for this purpose, in accordance with the current safety policy in DCS, are imp lemented the protection mechanisms. However, even if the countermeasures are already implemented there may remain so-called residual vulnerabilit ies that form the residual security risk, wh ich can be reduced by the additional protective mechanisms [31] .
One of the most important components of modern distributed computer systems is the Job Manager, which, inter alia, performs the distribution of solving tasks between the DCS resources, including the tasks related to the DCS security. The malfunctions of JM, particularly the time delays during the analysis of critical situations and decisions making, especially in the case when the DCS process the confidential in formation can disrupt or even a completely stop the DCS functioning [31] , [32] . Thus, the parameters analysis and the reducing of security risk for Job Manager operations is a very important task. Fig. 2 shows a generalized structural scheme of Job Manager [35] - [37] in the context of a risk-based approach.
IV. RISK-BASED SECURITY ANALYSIS OF T HE DISTRIBUT ED AND SCALABLE COMPUTER SYSTEMS
Let us introduce the next parameters: x 1 -the nu mber of nodes in a distributed computer system; x 2 -the number of data link channels; x 3 -the nu mber of the active security mechanisms; x 4 -the number o f the security monitoring tools in the DCS. Next , let α -the average intensity of the security threats for the DCS resources x 1 and x 2 ; β -the average intensity of the security mechanisms fro m the group x 3 and x 4 activation, and the parameter R 0 -the initial security risk.
To assess the security risks in the DCS, we introduce a function: Function R(t) is a risk of the DCS security threats realization, in depending on the time t.
There are some various ways for the risks changing, which depend on the relationship between the expressions: According to the statistical data, in the modern distributed computer systems, an average 25 intrusion attempts are launched per workstation in the daytime period [18] . Then in the DCS, consisting of 1000 nodes workstations, there are performed about 25,000 intrusion attempts per daytime period, and thus the expected value of the intensity of the security threat realization is α i =0.3, i.e., on average, the 1 intrusion attempt is launched every 3.33 seconds.
The evaluations of the security risks R in DCS allow performing the simulat ion for different configurations of distributed computer systems considering the resources scaling. Let us consider the configuration of a distributed DCS, which after the scaling has the following parameters: the maximu m nodes number x 1 max =1000; the maximu m nu mber of data lin ks channels x 2max = 5500; the maximu m nu mber of active security mechanisms x 3 max = 100; the maximu m nu mber of active security monitoring tools x 4max = 50.
Let us consider the various configurations of the DCS:
1. The DCS is scaled to the largest possible number of nodes and data links channels (x 1max = 1000, x 2ma x = 5500), and there are the maximu m possible number of active security mechanism and active security monitoring tools (x 3max = 100, x 4max =50).
2. The DCS is used x 3 = 50 active security mechanis ms; x 4 = 20 active security mon itoring tools for the maximu m possible number o f nodes and data links channels (x 1max = 1000, x 2max = 5500); 3. The DCS is used the maximu m possible number of active security mechanis ms and active security monitoring tools (x 3 max = 100, x 4 max = 50), and the DCS have x 1 = 700 nodes and x 2 = 3700 data link channels;
4. The DCS is used x 3 = 50 active security mechanis ms; x 4 = 20 active security monitoring tools, and the DCS have x 1 = 700 nodes and x 2 = 3700 data link channels.
Let us fix an average intensity of activation of the security mechanis ms fro m the group x 3 and x 4 at the level β = 0.4, the average intensity of realizat ion of the security threats to DCS resources x 1 and x 2 at the level α = 0.3. Next, we draw a set of the curves that are reflecting the functional dependence between the risk value R and the time t for the four above mentioned DCS configurations with the init ial risk R 0 = 0.2. The results are shown in Table 1 . In accordance with the data fro m the table 1, the Fig. 3 shows the dynamics of security risk R in time t. Fig. 3 shows that in the DCS configurations 2 and 4 there are the increasing of the security risk, that is caused by the fact that the number of active security and monitoring mechanis ms is insufficient for a given amount of the DCS resources and for a given intensities of intrusion realization and the security mechanisms activation. On the other hand, the for the DCS configurations 1 and 3, the number of active security and monitoring mechanisms is quite sufficient for preventive and protective measures, accordingly, the security risk is reduced. In the DCS configuration 3 the security risk is reducing in a sufficiently fast way and the risk level 0.15 is achieved after 3 seconds after the activation of the security mechanis ms. Fo r the DCS configuration 1, the same reduction of the security risk level takes about 6 seconds. This case is explained by the fact, that there is the excessive number of the active security and monitoring tools for DCS configuration 3. However, such redundancy allows in a more fast way provide the secure state of the computer system, thereby to min imize the time interval when the DCS is in a potentially dangerous state, that reduces the probability of the successful attacks from the intrusion agents. Thus, the proposed analytical assessment for security risk level in the DCS allo ws forecast the values of the critical time fo r the situation analysis and decisionmaking for the current configuration o f a distributed computing system. Th is forecast takes into account the number of used nodes and data links channels, the number of act ive security and monitoring mechanisms at the current period, as well as on the intensity of the events related to the security threats and the activation intensity of the intrusion prevention mechanisms. Also, the proposed comprehensive analytical assessments of the risk allo w analy zing the dynamics of intrusion processes, the dynamics of the security level recovery and the corresponding dynamics of the risks level in the DCS. The analysis of the probability of a crit ical t ime exceeding for the decision-making, i.e. the reaction t ime of the security mechanisms to the threats in case of dynamic change of DCS security parameters, requires to perform a formal description of the processes in the DCS job manager, in part icular, with dedicated networking mechanis ms and models that will allow dynamically evaluate the interval boundaries of critical response time for the actions of the intrusions agents.
